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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) as a 
budgetary instrument. A preliminary analysis of the quantitative impact of its first year and a 
half of activity is complemented by an outline of the corollary policies that can determine the 
success of EFSI. Taking into account the instrument’s original mission, the preliminary evidence 
is encouraging and suggests that it is on track to attain expected targets. For EFSI 2.0, the study 
recommends revising the regulation to provide a window-specific definition of additionality and 
strengthening parliamentary oversight. In order for EFSI to contribute to the greater goal of 
cohesion and development, it further recommends the creation of a Development Window 
with a special guarantee for riskier regions and a push on EFSI corollary policies, including the 
establishment of country offices for the Advisory Hub and the development of a strategy for 
investment in human capital. 
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Executive Summary 
Despite an increasing number of EU policies and objectives, the size of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework has fallen as a percentage of EU GDP compared to the budgets before the 
turn of the century. In addition, EU spending has been characterised by a high degree of rigidity 
in terms of key priorities and distribution of funds across member states (the problem of net 
balances). Such rigidity prevented the EU budget from growing organically as new policy 
objectives and design mechanisms emerged.  
As a consequence and particularly with the dawn of the financial crisis, the traditional EU 
budget grants are now increasingly complemented by a constellation of different funds used 
as equity or guarantees. There has been a rapid growth of increasingly complex and 
differentiated financing tools operating on and off the budget, via grants, loans, equity or 
blended instruments.   
The introduction of EFSI has brought not only the size of the financial instruments supported 
by the EU to another dimension financially, it has also created a very large instrument outside 
the governance structure of the EU budget. At this stage, as much as €163.9 billion have been 
estimated as total investment mobilised to finance EFSI-backed projects, thanks to the €22.4 
billion and €8.1 billion made available through the EIB and EIF respectively. To date, EFSI-
backed projects currently account for 52% of the targeted total investment planned to be 
mobilised by 2018; the multiplier effect also seems to be in line with the x15 target, which is 
evidence that EFSI appears to be on track to attain the 2018 targets, set at the launch of the 
initiative.  
On the distribution by sector, there are currently three sectors that alone cover about 3/4th of 
approved operations: smaller companies (31%), the energy sector (22%) and RDI (21%) of total 
EFSI support. Two sectors, namely social infrastructure and environment and resource 
efficiency, received below 5% of EFSI investment. The available data allow us to take a closer 
look at infrastructure operations by sector. With EFSI financing €7.7 billion (34%) and 
generating over €36 billion (38%) of mobilised investment, the energy sector is the primary 
beneficiary. Small companies, the transport sector and RDI follow with over €3 billion allocated 
to each sector.  
On the geographical distribution of funds, we have analysed the distribution by volume, per 
capita and as a share of GDP. Per volume, with 73% of the total investment mobilised, the main 
beneficiaries are the UK, Spain, France, Germany and Italy. Finland, Ireland, Spain, Italy and 
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Luxemburg take the lead in investment per capita, whilst if one considers the total investment 
mobilised as a share of GDP, less developed economies are in a better position with Estonia, 
Bulgaria, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece in the first six positions. 
In view of encouraging preliminary results, the European Commission has produced a proposal 
for amending the EFSI Regulation in which the EFSI initiative is to be extended by two years to 
2020, with the aim of increasing investment in the EU by €500 billion. This amount approximates 
the size of the combined European Structural and Investment Funds. This extension comes with 
an increase of the EU budget guarantee from €16 billion to €26 billion and EIB capital from €5 
billion to €7.5 billion, amounting to a total of €33.5 billion of public money.  
The key rationale for the introduction and extension of EFSI is to provide additionality by 
helping to address market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, which could not obtain 
investment in the absence of the EU guarantee. Projects supported by EFSI should, in principle, 
have a higher risk profile than the EIB standard portfolio. At the moment, projects are 
considered to provide additionality if they bear a risk that corresponds to EIB ‘Special Activities’, 
but there is a widespread consensus on the need to revise and clarify the current definition of 
additionality. As the two windows of EFSI respond to different market failures and are subject 
to different evaluation procedures, we recommend to amend the EFSI Regulation by including 
a window-specific definition of additionality. The Commission proposal to include risk-sharing 
arrangements, cross-border projects and securitisation within the new definition of 
additionality goes in the direction of providing a clearer indication of what additionality means 
in practice. Nevertheless, the types of contributions and additionality that EFSI can make 
remain rather broad and it is crucial to have access to the Scoreboard of indicators that informs 
the decision of the Investment Committee in order to have a clear picture of how additionality 
is measured and interpreted1. At the moment, the results of the assessment carried out by the 
Investment Committee have not been made public, which prevents us from understanding the 
expected added value of EFSI for each project supported by the EFSI Guarantee. It is likely that 
EFSI has contributed to an accelerated and increased rate of investment in the EU, but it is 
difficult to make a definitive determination without carrying out a detailed analysis.  
As far as the design of EFSI 2.0 is concerned, governance and transparency arrangements will 
also need to be addressed. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has recently issued a critical 
opinion on the Commission proposal to extend and expand EFSI. First, there is still limited 
evidence concerning the impact of the EFSI guarantee; secondly, it criticises the complex roles 
of EIB- and Commission-appointed officials in the EFSI decision-making process, which makes it 
difficult to identify who is responsible to budgetary and legislative authorities. The complex 
interrelations also made it difficult to identify possible conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the 
ECA mentioned that the Parliament had insisted on the need to ensure proactive public 
                                                     
1 The Commission proposal to extend EFSI to 2020 envisages that the Scoreboard of indicators and the justification 
of the Investment Committee decisions, cleaned of commercially sensitive information, are made public, after the 
signature. 
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disclosure of exhaustive and sound budgetary information and project-specific financial data. 
(ECA, 2016a) 
On the final mobilisation of the funds by EFSI (multiplier effect), it is important to note that the 
ECA recommends that the EIB should revise the methodology following OECD guidelines. 
According to the ECA (2016a), the current methodologies risk a systematic overestimation of 
the EFSI multiplier effect due to the fact that not all sources of finance attracted by an EFSI-
backed project are the result of the EFSI guarantee.   
The existence of many financial instruments inside the headings of the EU budget make it 
difficult to assess the coherency of EFSI with all other instruments. Some of the instruments 
seem to compete with each other and even undermine grant operations. Steps have been 
taken to explore synergies between EU budget instruments and EFSI, but more work is needed 
to ensure coherence between instruments and to facilitate complementarities. 
Specific aspects pertaining to the allocation of equity financing and to the backing of venture 
capital funds may contradict standard EU budgetary practices. There is a general consensus on 
the need to promote equity-based financing in Europe and the high demand of support from 
the EFSI SME window may well indicate that such policy should respond to the concrete needs 
of EU-based SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps. Nevertheless, the direct support given to financial 
intermediaries, which are then responsible of the allocation of EU financing, may generate a 
situation in which there is little knowledge about the final beneficiaries of the EU guarantee, so 
that both accountability and the measurement of the results end up substantially 
compromised. 
Despite critical points, a policy instrument like EFSI is needed for periods in which the financial 
sector is excessively risk averse or simply blocked by difficult market conditions. Augmenting 
the risk-bearing capacity of EU institutions, in the form of a solid EU guarantee and first loss 
piece (FLP) provided to operations, appears appropriate given the current market conditions 
affecting Europe, where in fact the investment gap is more directly linked to risk averseness than 
a lack of liquidity.  
At present, EFSI appears to have enhanced support toward projects with higher risk profiles 
than standard EIB activities thanks to its joint use with other EU budget funds (ESIF, CEF and 
H2020) that finance a First Loss protection mechanism and allow EFSI to cover mezzanine or 
subordinated financing.  
In its current structure, EFSI is not designed to focus on non-bankable projects or areas with 
particularly high risk. That would require investments to be handled with a development bank 
guarantee system, in which the loans are covered by guarantees by a much higher share and 
covering all investors or allowing the EIB to cover a larger share of the costs. In its activities 
within the EU, the EIB itself is not a development bank and EFSI is not an instrument to replace 
grants or to perform development investment. There is a possibility to promote such a role and 
to open the funds further to riskier areas in the EU, therefore, we recommend the creation 
within EFSI of a Development Window with a structure in line with the needs of riskier regions of 
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the EU. After all, EFSI still needs to be based on a banking logic and has to attract private 
financiers. This cannot be done by simple command, rather only if the instrument is fit for 
purpose. In this context, three possibilities to combine EFSI guarantees with other EU financing 
programmes should also be analysed.   
One of the goals of EFSI was to relaunch investment targeted at SMEs, start-ups and innovative 
firms alike. It is too early to evaluate the impact of EFSI in promoting technological 
transformation and innovation across Europe, but undoubtedly the programme is moving in the 
right direction. Its results will have to be assessed in the medium to long term.  
To make sure that EFSI contributes to the greater goal of relaunching investment and economic 
growth across Europe, it remains crucial to advance on the Investment Plan for Europe as a 
whole, so that also the second and third pillar of the plan bring contribution to the EU’s 
economies. Removing regulatory barriers to investment at both national and European levels 
should remain a priority, as well as the implementation of structural reforms, which can 
generate a better environment for investment. As technical assistance is deemed crucial to 
enhance the geographical coverage of EFSI, the Advisory Hub should not only be given a greater 
role but endowed with the resources necessary to meet the challenges and tasks it has to face. 
As the geographical coverage of corollary policies, such as the Advisory Hub, is functional to 
ensuring geographical coverage for EFSI interventions, we recommend the establishment of 
EIAH local offices on top of network partnerships. The creation of Investment Hubs at national 
level could bring in expertise from the EIB Group, National Promotional Banks (NPBs) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in order to enhance and make 
available comprehensive advisory services on-the-spot. Such Investment Hubs could also be 
given a mandate to monitor and support national efforts towards removing barriers to 
investment, in partnership with national authorities and the Structural Reform Support Service 
(SRSS).   
This paper also recommends avoiding linking the rules governing EFSI, which is based on a return-
to-investment logic, to the budget deficit procedures of member states. If projects are assessed 
on their merits, such rules are counterproductive, as they reduce the ability to attract quality 
investments in regions where those are most needed. EFSI investments can promote structural 
and administrative reform as they require a shift in focus from pure public expenditure to the 
use of revenue-generating solutions where possible.  
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1. Introduction 
In about one year’s time, the European Commission will put forward its vision and proposal for 
the post-2020 EU budget. The current situation reveals a growing disconnect between 
expectations of the EU budget, its structure and its financial capacity. Despite an increasing 
number of EU policies and objectives, the budget structure of EU spending has been 
characterised by a high degree of rigidity. Such rigidity, partly due to the legislative process and 
partly due to the member states’ approach focusing on net balances, has prevented the EU 
budget from growing organically as new policy objectives and new policy design mechanisms 
emerged. The European Commission has made large efforts to integrate new EU policy 
objectives into existing headings and to design a budget that is more flexible and capable of 
responding to emerging challenges facing the EU.  
Financial instruments are increasingly deployed by the EU for the purpose of stimulating 
economic growth and creating jobs. To this end, the instruments are typically designed to 
stimulate investments in cases where, due to market failure or sub-optimal investment, they 
simply do not materialise. They have been introduced primarily in the areas of SME support, 
research and innovation, energy and the climate change. In the EU’s current economic 
environment, which is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and low growth, financial 
risk is in many cases the key barrier to investment. Financial instruments allow the public sector 
to absorb some of the risks by offering risk-sharing facilities (e.g. loans, guarantees, equity 
participation) in order to make projects bankable. In this way, scarce EU budgetary resources 
are used efficiently: As opposed to traditional direct funding of projects, they mobilise a much 
higher amount of total investment by catalysing a maximum of co-investment from the private 
sector (leverage effect). 
The introduction of the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), in mid-2015, has 
brought not only the size of the financial instruments supported by the EU to another 
dimension financially, but also created a very large instrument outside the standard governance 
structure of the EU budget. As stressed in Nunez Ferrer et al. (2016) and in the Monti Report 
(2016), EFSI alone has the potential of mobilising investments (target €315 billion) that rival the 
size of the cohesion policy (€351.80 billion); and the sum of all EU financial instruments 
managed by the EC, EIB and EIF could rival the whole EU budget by 2020. (Nunez Ferrer et al., 
2016: 35) As of mid-December 2016, the total investment mobilised by EFSI-backed projects 
amounts to about 52% of the expected investment by 2018. As much as €163.9 billion have 
been mobilised to finance EFSI-backed projects, thanks to the €22.4 billion and €8.1 billion 
made available through the EIB and EIF, respectively.   
About a year into the programme, with still-partial information about EFSI’s outcomes and 
impact, the Commission decided to move forward and propose an extension till 2020. The 
Commission’s evaluation of the use of the EU Guarantee and the functioning on the Guarantee 
Fund in the first year, presented together with the proposal for its renewal, concludes that “the 
first year of experience shows that it has been an efficient and effective way of considerably 
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increasing the volume of EIB special activities and EIF guarantees in favour of SMEs and mid-
caps.” (European Commission, 2016a: 19) 
The notion that EFSI is a success, however, is not an uncontested matter. Legitimately, some 
criticism arises from the extent to which it can be effective as a stimulus package to relaunch 
economic growth in Europe (Le Moigne, Saraceno and Villemot, 2016), on whether it can truly 
promote additionality (Claeys and Leandro, 2016, Rubio et al., 2016, and ECA, 2016a), on 
whether it generates a high risk of geographic concentration (Rubio et al., 2016), and on 
whether the current governance and transparency arrangements are in line with EU standards 
on democratic accountability (ECA, 2016 and TI, 2016).  
Even the comprehensive evaluations carried out by the EIB (2016) and EY (2016) agree on the 
need to revise the way in which the Regulation defines additionality and to enhance the 
technical assistance accompanying EFSI deployment. In fact, the Commission, notwithstanding 
a very positive assessment of EFSI’s operations so far carried out, suggests an update to the 
definition of additionality to encourage investment into cross-border infrastructure, risk-
sharing arrangements and securitisation and a stronger role of the European Investment 
Advisory Hub (EIAH) to improve on the sectoral and geographical coverage of the EFSI.2 
The Commission proposal for a two-year extension of EFSI also introduces a new targeted 
objective of €500 billion of total mobilised investment (European Commission, 2016a). Such 
extension comes with an increase of the EU budget guarantee from €16 billion to €26 billion 
and EIB capital from €5 billion to €7.5 billion, amounting to a total of €33.5 billion of public 
money. Building on the results of the SME Window (SMEW), it is suggested that a larger share 
of financing should be tailored towards SMEs, which would lead to 40% of the increase of the 
EFSI’s risk-bearing capacity to be allocated to SME projects.  
The financial and investment arm of the Union, already largely reshaped by the introduction of 
EFSI, would end up being rather transformed if the proposal and the new target go through. 
Figure 1 shows that the expected total investment mobilised by EFSI, if prolonged to 2020, as 
proposed by the Commission, could reach the size of the EU budget for European Structural 
and Investment Funds (ESIF).  
                                                     
2 For a detailed account of the proposed extension and an overview of the Council, European Council and European 
Parliament starting positions, see EPRS (2016a).   
THE EUROPEAN FUND FOR STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS AS A NEW TYPE OF BUDGETARY INSTRUMENT | 7 
 
Figure 1. Mobilised investment with EFSI and ESIF (€billion) 
 
Note: EFSI (I+II) is modelled according to the latest Commission’s proposal (14 September 2016) 
to extend the EFSI until the end of the current MFF. 
* Member states’ co-financing for the EFSI is represented by the voluntary contributions made 
available via NPBs. 
** Private investment is estimated according to an average x15 leverage for the EFSI and is 
considered as negligible for ESIF.  
Data source: European Commission.  
The present paper first provides, in section 2, an account of EFSI-mobilised investment to date, 
and then section 3 explores key issues of particular relevance in view of an extension of the 
programme: additionality, coherence with other instruments of the EU budget, respect of basic 
principles of democratic accountability and of unity of the EU budget. Section 4 attempts to 
provide a more global assessment of EFSI by putting it into the context of a broader mandate 
and in relationship with corollary policies included in the Investment Plan for Europe and with 
the EU macroeconomic framework. Section 5 offers succinct conclusions.  
2. EFSI Operations to Date 
This section provides a descriptive quantitative analysis of EFSI operations up until 16 
December 2016.3 The total mobilised investment related to EFSI-backed projects had reached 
about €164 billion. With almost exactly one-half of the total EFSI resources4 spent (€31 billion 
out of €61 billion, representing 52% of the fund), EFSI reportedly had mobilised about one-half 
of the intended total investment (€164 billion out of €315 billion). Accordingly, with two more 
                                                     
3 The data analysis is based on publically available data provided by the EIB (for the IIW) and by the EIF (for the 
SMEW), as made available on 23 December 2016.  
4 Figures include the 3-fold “internal multiplier“. 
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years to go, it appears to be on track to meet the targeted leverage effect and the targeted 
investment by 2018.   
2.1 Data availability 
The quantitative analysis carried out in this paper is subject to data limitations. For the 
Infrastructure and Innovation Window (IIW), project-specific data for both EFSI contributions 
and total investment mobilised are only partially available. Out of 176 approved projects, 24 
have undisclosed EFSI contributions and 55 have undisclosed total expected mobilised 
investment.5 Approximately, about 19% of the financial volume of EFSI IIW contributions and 
50% of the mobilised investment are undisclosed. 
For the SME Window (SMEW), a list of financial intermediaries for both equity and guarantee 
operations is public. However, financial figures are only published for the latter. Additionally, 
the distribution of SMEW operations by member state is scant, as 28% of the financial volume 
is listed under “Multi-Country” with no specification on the countries involved.6  
2.2 EFSI Investment by sector  
EFSI Regulation Article 9(2) defines the eligible sectors/areas of intervention, for which there is 
no pre-determined quota. Nonetheless, the Steering Board Regulation introduces an indicative 
concentration limit of 30% for the IIW. The SMEW, however, has no specific ceiling target, given 
that the EIF, operating through intermediaries, cannot exert the same degree of control over 
sector distribution as the EIB. (EY, 2016).  
Looking at both windows together, there are three sectors alone that cover about 3/4th of 
approved operations: smaller companies (31%), the energy sector (22%) and RDI (21% of total 
EFSI support). Two sectors, namely social infrastructure and environment and resource 
efficiency, received below 5% of EFSI investment. The data available allow us to take a closer 
look at operations by sector for the IIW. As shown in Figure 2, with €7.7 billion (34%) of EFSI 
financing and over €36 billion (38%) of mobilised investment, the energy sector, where most 
volumes and operations concentrate, was the greatest beneficiary. Small companies, the 
transport sector and RDI follow with over €3 billion allocated to each sector.  
                                                     
5 Data unavailability is largely due to delayed disclosure in respect of confidentiality aspects requested by project 
promoters.  
6 “Multi-country” projects are also present in the IIW, but are of a much more limited amount: 0.5% of IIW 
approved financing. Venture capital and equity funds, typically supported by the SEW, often have a multi-country 
focus. 
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Figure 2. EFSI IIW investment, by sector 
Notes: The shares of EFSI investment by sector differ from the aggregate data released by the EIB as the figures above build on 
project-specific data. The share by sector refers to the total €94 billion investment mobilised under the IIW estimated at 
approval. 
Source: EIB website.  
 
2.3 Size of operations for the IIW 
A brief look at the size of the operations of EFSI IIW investments can shed light on whether the 
fund has been able to attract small-scale projects as well.  
While the number of relatively small projects (<€150 million) is significantly higher than that of 
larger projects (109 projects out of the 152 for which data are available7), the financial volume 
is more evenly distributed. About one-half the financial volume is invested in projects valued at 
less than €200 million.  
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the volume of investment and the number of projects by 
the size of the EFSI-backed projects. Their financial volume, shown in a lighter shade of blue, is 
calculated on the basis of the known total of EFSI IIW spending. The average financial volume 
is higher for the undisclosed projects, at €176 million, than for those disclosed.  
If one looks at the size distribution of the mobilised investment, Figure 3b, one notices that the 
mobilised investment associated with projects with undisclosed data corresponds to one-half 
of the total volume of investment mobilised. Notably, the undisclosed projects are on average 
more than twice as large as the disclosed.  
                                                     
7 Some 24 out of 176 projects have undisclosed information about the size of the project.  
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Figure 3. Size of IIW operations (€million) 
 
Source: EIB websites, authors’ elaboration. 
 
2.4 Geographical Distribution 
The EFSI has been designed to allocate financial support without political interference in the 
selection of projects or reference to country quotas. The market-based rationale on which it 
has been constructed unquestionably makes it more prone to support those economies in 
which the market is more advanced.  
Nonetheless, a sufficiently broad geographical coverage is expected in order to: i) boost 
competitiveness and job creation throughout Europe, ii) prevent divergence among European 
regions and iii) secure portfolio differentiation and avoid the financial risk of excessive 
concentration. Since the very beginning of it operations, the uneven geographical distribution 
of financial support has been addressed as one of the primary deficiencies of the programme. 
?
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The Independent Evaluation conducted by EY (2016) reports that, in absolute terms, EU-15 
received over 90% of EFSI support with the 13 new member states receiving a mere 9%. 
Interestingly, the report identifies five possible reasons for which EFSI-related investment is 
markedly lower in the Central and Eastern European member states: i) competition from the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), ii) less capacity to develop large bankable 
projects, iii) lack of experience with public private partnerships (PPP), iv) insufficiently 
developed venture capital culture and v) the excessively small size of projects.   
By considering EFSI-related mobilised investment by member state in absolute values, as 
depicted in Figure 4, it is straightforward to note that the UK, Spain, France, Germany and Italy 
are the top five beneficiaries of the IIW, accounting for over 73% of the mobilised investment. 
These same five countries are also the top beneficiaries for the SMEW, but in a different order, 
with Italy alone benefiting from almost 38% of the guarantees and equity made available by 
the EIF. 
Figure 4. EFSI-mobilised investment by member state (€million) 
Notes: From left to right, member state are in descending order according to their GDP per capita. Multi-country projects are 
not represented for either IIW or SMEW.  
Source: EIB and EIF websites. 
The distribution of the total EFSI-related investment appears much less concentrated, once 
either the size of the economy or the population is accounted for.  
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Figure 5. Ranking of EFSI top 5 beneficiaries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
The top five economies no longer appear as distinct outliers. Figure 5 offers a quick look at the 
top beneficiaries according to the different ways of measuring investment distribution by 
member state. Figure 6 presents both the mobilised investment as a percentage of the 
recipient GDP and as a function of its population. In per capita terms, the member states that 
have benefited the most from EFSI interventions are Finland, Ireland, Spain, Italy and 
Luxembourg, each receiving more than €400 per inhabitant in new mobilised investment. 
Once we consider the mobilised investment in relation to the GDP of the recipient country, 
there is no more evidence of a concentration favouring the biggest EU economies. Romania, 
Croatia and Hungary remain disadvantaged compared to EU economies of a similar size. 
Estonia, Bulgaria and Spain have EFSI-backed investments worth over 2% of their GDP. 
Figure 6. EFSI-mobilised investment over GDP and population, by member state 
Notes: From left to right, member state appear in descending order according to their GDP per capita. Multi-country projects 
are not represented for either IIW or SMEW.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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2.5 Leverage 
The multiplier effect, which is one of the key performance indicators of EFSI, is crucial for 
assessing its capacity to leverage private (and public) investment. The actual multiplier for EFSI 
can only be measured at the end of the investment period at the portfolio level, but we can 
have an idea of its likelihood to attain expected targets by monitoring its evolution. Actually, 
the EIB is required to calculate multipliers at the level of each transaction and on an ex-ante 
basis, but it does not make such data public (EIB, 2016a). 
The procedure to calculate the current multiplier effect, explained in EIB (2015), is rather 
complex and it goes beyond the scope of this paper to provide a technical account on the 
matter, not to mention the lack of data available. Nonetheless, with a rule of thumb calculation 
we can approximate the external multiplier to x5.3. Under the assumption that the average 
internal multiplier equals x3, the current total multiplier effect is estimated at x15.9, which is 
just slightly above the announced target of x15. 
This result is in line with the recent estimations reported by EY (2016), with data covering 
operations signed as at 30 June 2016 and identifying a total multiplier effect of x14.1. Overall, 
the EFSI appears to be on track in leveraging private investment to reach the target multiplier of 
x15 on the total portfolio after three years of operations.  
Whilst excessive confidence in preliminary results is to be avoided, the multiplier effect is 
expected to increase over time thanks to the development of new products. For the IIW, a large 
part of the first operations approved were projects already in preparation before EFSI existed8 
and do not take advantage of the new products that have been progressively developed. New 
project-targeted products are therefore likely to improve the multiplier effect for this Window. 
(EIB, 2016a) Likewise, for the SMEW, the progressive development of equity-like products, to 
complement lower-leverage debt products that had been used when EFSI was first 
operationalised, give the promise of an increased multiplier effect (EY, 2016). 
It is important to note that the ECA (2016a) recommends the EIB to revise the methodology to 
compute the multiplier effect and follow OECD guidelines. In fact, according to the ECA (2016a), 
the current methodologies risk a systematic overestimation of the EFSI multiplier effect due to 
the fact that not all sources of finance attracted to an EFSI-backed project are the result of the 
EFSI guarantee. The European Commission and EIB already stressed that OECD guidelines 
designed for Official Development Aid are not suited for the EFSI context which makes use of 
public funds as guarantees, but the issue of bringing transparency to the identification of the 
multiplier effect remain open and new clear-cut methodology should be defined for EFSI 2.0.      
                                                     
8 Some projects were approved before the EFSI Regulation was finalised and the EC-EIB EFSI Agreement was 
finalised in July 2015. The EIB was requested to use existing capital until the EU Guarantee support (as per the 
transitional provision of the EFSI Regulation) would become available.  
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3. Open Questions 
Within EFSI, and particularly in light of its extension to 2020, some issues remain open to 
improvements and will be the key subject of negotiations for the EFSI 2.0. In what follows, 
without the ambition of being fully comprehensive, we provide a brief account of the main 
issues that will pertain to EFSI additionality, democratic accountability and its relation with 
other EU programmes and with the EU budget.  
3.1 Additionality 
The key rationale for the introduction of EFSI is to provide additionality by helping to address 
market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, which could not obtain investment in the 
absence of the EU guarantee. Defining additionality properly and ensuring its application in 
practice is therefore of pivotal relevance. The definition of additionality included in Art. 5.1 of 
the EFSI Regulation is relatively broad. EFSI support is considered to provide additionality if the 
project bears a risk that corresponds to EIB ‘Special Activities’ as defined in Article 16 of the EIB 
Statute. A project is classified as a Special Activity if the inherent risk of the project is higher on 
average than the bank’s conventional risk-mix lending and would generally not be accepted by 
the EIB under normal activities. After receiving the EFSI support, a project’s credit rating is 
enhanced and is generally in line with risk profiles normally accepted by the bank. The current 
regulation, however, also opens the possibility for projects carrying a lower-than-minimum risk 
than EIB Special Activities to be considered within the boundaries of additionality. In fact, an 
EFSI intervention is considered additional not only if the project would not have been carried 
out without the EFSI guarantee in the period during which the EU Guarantee could be used, 
but also if it would not have been carried out ‘to the same extent’ by the EIB or the EIF, or under 
existing EU financial instruments. Such definition is so broad, however, that it can hardly be 
said that the current EFSI regulation secures a use of the EU guarantee to correct market 
failures and situations of sub-optimal investment. 
To enhance the design of EFSI 2.0, which is likely to run till 2020, it is recommended to examine 
how the Investment Committee has interpreted such principle in practice. As underlined by 
Claeys and Leandro (2016), the best way to assess the ‘additionality’ of the projects would be 
to know the risk profile of each EFSI project, but this information at the moment is not available. 
The EFSI Scoreboard of indicators does offer a framework for the evaluation of additionality for 
proposed projects, but at present, the results of the assessment carried out by the Investment 
Committee are not made public, which prevents us from understanding the expected added 
value of EFSI for each project supported by the EFSI Guarantee. Such concerns over the 
transparency of the assessment carried out by the Investment Committee, also advanced by 
ECA (2016a) and TI (2016), seem to have been taken aboard by the Commission in its proposal 
for EFSI 2.0.  
The Commission proposal also puts forward amendments to the definition of additionality and 
proposes including risk-sharing arrangements, cross-border projects and securitisation within 
the boundaries of additionality. The new proposed regulation for additionality goes in the 
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direction of a more precise definition of what additionality can mean in practice; nevertheless, 
the types of contributions and additionality that EFSI can make remain rather complex and 
broad at this time. (ECA, 2016) 
With a view to providing a better understanding of the different forms that additionality can 
take, Figure 7 summarises graphically, without pretending to be exhaustive, the three specific 
notions advanced by the Commission proposal for EFSI 2.0 (in grey) and further applications of 
additionality as so far interpreted (in blue). A swift overview of EFSI-sponsored projects under 
the IIW and interviews with the EIB staff clarify in fact that additionality materialised in different 
ways. Particularly, such preliminary analysis reveals that EFSI operations have found 
additionality in: i) speeding up the time frame for the implementation of projects; ii) bringing 
market confidence around a project by providing a first loss pieces (FLP) guarantee or by simply 
assuring the involvement of the bank; iii) reaching new clients, which have no history or track 
record of activity with the EIB;9 iv) securing a large quantitative effect by funding smaller shares 
of the total investment cost for a higher number of projects; v) fostering EU quality standards 
in the design and implementation of supported projects; and vi) supporting the adoption of 
latest and more expensive technology, de facto accelerating energy and digital transition10. 
Furthermore, it is necessary for the public and policy-makers to acquire a better understanding 
of the difference between additionality per se, i.e. what EFSI operations bring to the market, 
and the EIB/EFSI value added, which could instead be defined as the EIB/EFSI contribution to 
the project itself.   
It should be noted that, as EIF activities are supposedly all responding to a market failure of 
sub-optimal investment, the scrutiny of additionality within the SMEW appears particularly 
loose.  Of course, an analysis of additionality is part of the assessment of all EIF transactions 
brought to the EIF Board, but we consider necessary to shed light on EFSI additionality in the 
SMEW, as it is less clear how EFSI is additional to pre-existing programmes for SME support. To 
this end we recommend considering the possibility to revise the Art. 4 of EFSI Regulation in 
order to allow for a window-specific definition of additionality. As the IIW and the SMEW are 
meant to respond to dissimilar market failures and have a different procedure for project 
evaluation, the definition of additionality should be tailored and targeted to the objectives that 
each window pursues.   
                                                     
9 Unofficial data suggest that about 60% of EFSI IIW promoters are new clients for the EIB. If such a figure were 
confirmed, it would become indisputable that EFSI is not ‘business as usual’ for the EIB.   
10 On EFSI’s use to speed up latest technologies, see the case studies in Rubio et al. (2016).  
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Figure 7. Understanding the types of additionality 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
3.2 Coherence and synergies with EU Budget Instruments 
The European Commission has made large efforts to integrate new EU policy objectives into 
existing headings and to design a budget that is more flexible and capable of responding to 
emerging challenges facing the EU. The traditional EU budget grants are now complemented 
by a constellation of different funds used as equity or guarantees. There has been a rapid 
growth of increasingly complex and differentiated financing tools operating on and off budget, 
via grants, loans or equity or blended instruments. The consequence is not only a growing 
complexity of the EU budget, but a challenge to the governance of the EU’s financial arm. 
Several programmes have been built ad hoc and placed outside the MFF, thus outside the 
scrutiny of the EU’s budgetary authorities. In fact, items placed outside the EU budget are not 
under the scrutiny of the European Parliament. The different funds and instruments backed by 
the EU budget (such as EFSI) should follow a coherent and unified governance structure and 
abide by the core principles as stated in the financial regulation of the EU. 
The Commission’s initiative to launch the “EU Budget Focused on Results”11 has increased the 
attention paid to the performance of EU spending and has brought new commitment and 
political room to rethinking the architecture of EU expenditures in order to maximise impact. 
With the ambition of securing the efficiency and effectiveness of present budgetary 
instruments, it becomes essential to avoid duplication of effort and foster synergies and 
complementarities between instruments.  
Since EFSI entered into force, both the Commission and the EIB have realised that 
strengthening complementarities between the new EU guarantee and the other financial 
resources of the Union was pivotal both to the overall coherence of EU policies and to the 
                                                     
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget4results/initiative/index_en.cfm. 
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sustainability of EU-backed projects. Guidelines to combine EFSI and ESIF financing have been 
provided12 but on many aspects it is not yet clear how to better combine grant elements with 
equity-like financing and how to keep a moderate administrative burden for promoters, so that 
access to joint-financing is not restricted to top-performing managing authorities. EY (2016) 
shows that differences in eligibility criteria, regulations, timeframe for reporting and the 
application of state aid rules hinder combined usage. In cohesion countries receiving large 
amounts of funding through ESIF, that translates into a strong competition between EFSI and 
ESIF. At present, member states give priority to the absorption of pre-allocated funds with a 
grant component; however, if the macroeconomic conditionality of ESIF funds will be 
reinforced in the post-2020 MFF, the favour could switch towards marked-based instruments 
such as EFSI with no conditionality, if still in place.  
There is also evidence that EFSI can work together with ESIF, Horizon 2020 and CEF. A number 
of projects have in fact benefitted from multiple sources of financing and have been able to 
combine funds effectively.13 One of the most exploited synergies consists of having the 
Commission fund the FLP of operations with CEF or H2020 funds, whilst the EIB, through EFSI, 
finances mezzanine tranches. (EY, 2016: 39) The investment platform ‘Connecting Europe 
Broadband Fund’14 also represents another potentially effective way to combine EFSI and CEF 
resources for the deployment of broadband in low density areas. In Spain, a project in the 
transport sector,15 has been supported simultaneously by ESIF, EFSI and CEF.  
Particularly for research, development and innovation (RDI) investment, which can be financed 
through a multiplicity of instruments, there might be a particular high risk of fragmentation, 
which can undermine the innovation potential of the EU budget. Few instructions and good 
practices have been identified in this area.16 On the contrary, not only specific guidelines should 
be provided but the entire architecture and interplay between Horizon 2020, Connecting 
Europe Facility, ESI funds and EFSI need to be revised to avoid a geographical concentration of 
RDI capital, which may be detrimental to territorial cohesion and economic convergence.  The 
evaluations carried out in EIB (2016) and EY (2016) both confirm that the cooperation between 
EFSI, CEF and Horizon 2020 funds are subject to a certain degree of risk as the adoption of the 
EFSI guarantee is generally preferred. In particular, as EFSI and the CEF debt instrument cover 
                                                     
12 See European Commission, European Structural and Investment Funds and European Fund for Strategic 
Investments complementarities: Ensuring Coordination, Synergies and Complementarities, 2016.  
13 Among others, for the IIW: the ‘Novamont Renewable Chemistry’ industry/RDI project and the ‘Telecom Italia 
Accelerated Fixed High speed’ broadband project both in Italy, the ‘Nord Pas de Calais TRI Fund’, for industrial 
transformation projects in France; a ‘public-private partnership for the D4-R7’ highways in Slovakia have 
benefitted from both EFSI and ESI funds. For the SMEW: the ‘Swedish Venture Initiative’ and the ‘EstFund’ brought 
together EFSI and ESI funds to provide equity capital for early-stage high-growth enterprises in Sweden and 
Estonia.  
14 See section 4.3 of this Paper.  
15 See the EIB fiche for the ‘Accessibility Ports Infrastructures’ project at 
www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/2015/20150115.htm. 
16 See for instance European Commission, EU Funds working together for jobs & growth, Synergies between the 
R&I Framework Programmes and the European Structural & Investment Funds, 2016.  
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the same type of investments, there is a sort of competition between the two instruments and 
evidence that CEF-eligible projects ended up being financed by EFSI. (EY, 2016: 40) 
A potential risk of overlaps is also detected with respect to SME financing. Products from 
COSME, InnovFin and EFSI SMEW are, with minor differences, targeted to similar beneficiaries 
and are meant to respond to alike market failures.17 At the moment, the EFSI guarantee has 
been used, through the SMEW, to frontload guarantee operations under the COSME14 and 
InnovFin15 financial instruments. In other words, the EFSI SMEW enhanced the COSME Loan 
Guarantee Facility (LGF) and the InnovFin SME Guarantee (SMEG), supported by Horizon 2020 
funds as well.   
It has to be acknowledge that given the investment gap and the historical lack of equity-based 
financing in Europe, there is room for a multiplicity of EU programmes insisting on SMEs 
financing and innovation; however, a process of rationalisation should be facilitated and the 
risk of excessive fragmentation in use of EU resources must be prevented. 
Figure 8 helps to visualise the different financing sources that are available from the EU 
institutions. One can notice, for instance, that better clarity concerning potential 
complementarities should be attained within the activities of the EIB itself. 
Figure 8. A multiplicity of instruments 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
As the EFSI Regulation suggests an interpretation of EFSI additionality that promotes an 
equivalence between EFSI and the EIB’s use of Special Activity status, it is worth wondering 
whether in the future the EIB expects to have a neat distinction between EFSI and EIB special 
activities. The bank also manages additional funds, such as the European Energy Efficiency 
Fund, launched in mid-2011, or the 2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and 
Infrastructure, also called Marguerite Fund, operational since 2010, which enjoy partnership 
with NPBs and have objectives, eligible sectors and beneficiaries that overlap with EFSI.   
                                                     
17 The InnovFin SME Guarantee has stricter eligibility criteria and focuses predominantly on innovative SMEs. The 
COSME guarantee can instead support SMEs at large, including innovative ones. 
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3.3 Principle of unity, transparency and universality 
EFSI has generated worries on the principles of the EU budget, particularly those on unity, 
transparency and universality. This section assesses briefly the instrument and highlights 
concerns with respect to the general principles linked to the employment of the EU budget. 
Article 7 of the Financial Regulation (European Commission, 2014) stipulates that the EU budget 
shall comprise of all revenues and institutional and operational expenditures occasioned by the 
provisions of the TEU and the European Atomic Energy Community. This requires (Art 7 § 2) 
the recording of the “guarantees for borrowing-and-lending operations entered into by the 
Union, including the European Financial Stability Mechanism and Balance of Payment Facility 
operations, in accordance with point (d) of Article 49(1).” 
Article 8 presents specific rules which create some challenges for EFSI. EFSI allows for 
contributions by member states. This practice, which is allowed for a number of other funds, 
such as trust funds for instance, may create de-facto EU revenues outside the budget. This has 
been driven by the impossibility of the EU to address needs and the objectives of its policies. It 
allows to enhance the financial interventions without breaching the EU budget ceilings. The 
current voluntary system in which member states contribute to EFSI-backed projects via NPBs 
does not appear to breach the principle of unity.  
The problem with such arrangements, apart from the increased opacity on the real size of the 
budget and its operations (i.e. affecting the principle of transparency), is the lack of certainty 
on the actual size of the guarantee fund.  
EFSI regulations do not allow member states to influence, through their contributions, the use 
of EFSI funds or its governance (Article 4, paragraph 2k), which is important in order to preserve 
the principle of universality of the budget, i.e. the budget resources are pooled and are not 
allocated based on the source of the revenues. This principle is indirectly violated in the budget 
due to the strong influence of the net balances in negotiations. 
3.4 Accountability and democratic control 
The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has recently issued a critical opinion on the Commission 
proposal to extend and expand EFSI. According to the ECA (2016a), on top of the still limited 
evidence concerning the impact of the EFSI guarantee, there are governance and transparency 
arrangements to address. The ECA criticises that the complex roles of the EIB’s and 
Commission’s appointed officials in the EFSI decision-making process made it difficult to 
identify who is responsible to budgetary and legislative authorities. The complex interrelations 
also made it difficult to identify possible conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the ECA mentioned 
that the Parliament had insisted on the need to ensure proactive public disclosure of exhaustive 
and sound budgetary information and project-specific financial data. 
TI (2016) has also highlighted that the work of the EFSI Investment Committee needs to be 
made more accountable and transparent. Its report recommends, for instance, that 
20 | RINALDI & NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
consideration should be given to including a representative of the European Parliament on the 
Investment Committee. Such reform, with the addition of one new member to the Investment 
Committee, would provide at least some partial parliamentary oversight to EFSI allocation 
decisions, without undermining market-oriented decision-making. It was decided that no 
member of the Commission or of the EIB should be appointed to the Investment Committee to 
ensure that it performs its function independently. Securing the independence of the 
Investment Committee must remain a priority, but new arrangements should be considered to 
enhance its accountability.18 Parliamentary oversight could also be improved by providing the 
European Parliament with a stronger say in the composition of the EFSI Steering Board, 
providing scrutiny over the Commission’s appointments. In fact, EFSI Regulation focuses on 
ensuring political independence of the Steering Board and of the experts comprising the 
Investment Committee from national authorities and the EIB. Arrangements to enhance the 
democratic accountability should therefore make sure that the functioning of EFSI is protected 
from member states interests, but the involvement of the European Parliament, subject to 
stringent conditions, is not to be excluded.  
Lastly, specific aspects pertaining to the allocation of equity financing and to the backing of 
venture capital funds may contradict standard EU budgetary practices. There is general 
consensus on the need to promote equity-based financing in Europe, and the high demand of 
support from the EFSI SMEW may well indicate that such a policy responds to a concrete need 
of EU-based SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps. Nevertheless, the direct support given to financial 
intermediaries, which are then responsible for the allocation of EU financing, may generate a 
situation in which there is little knowledge about the final beneficiaries of the EU guarantee, 
thereby substantially compromising both the accountability and the measurement of the 
results. 
The accountability of financial instruments under shared and central management is regulated 
by the Common Provision Regulation, Art. 37(2&3), and the Financial Regulation, respectively. 
Requirements are quite strict and an ex-ante assessment based on a detailed set of criteria 
needs to be carried out by the managing authority.19 Similar financial products made available 
through the SMEW comply instead with the EIF rules and procedures. The lack of uniformity 
may exacerbate the competition between instruments and create the possibility to bypass 
monitoring provisions. It is therefore recommended to move concrete steps towards a 
harmonisation of accountability requirements for the EU instruments providing equity financing, 
in the view of enhancing their joint and complementary employment.   
                                                     
18 EFSI Regulation stresses that political independence of the experts of the Investment Committee is key with 
respect to national authorities and the EIB.  
19 See ECA (2016b), Annex V and Fi-Compass (2014).  
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4. Overall appraisal and EU Added Value 
For a fair assessment of the EFSI’s effectiveness, it is important to evaluate the instrument on 
the basis of its primary objective and the institutional structure on which it is designed. Many 
claims have been based on what the EFSI should do, but the focus should rather be on whether 
it does what it was designed to do.  
EFSI was conceived to quick-start investments in the EU with a limited (maximum 25% or higher 
for the SMEW) guarantee coverage, focusing on bankable projects suffering from a market 
failure, higher risk profile or simply suboptimal investment conditions – in other words, any 
bankable project that has not been taken on by the market.  
The instrument is thus designed for a period in which the financial sector is excessively risk-
averse or simply blocked by difficult market conditions, whichever is the case. As stressed by 
EY (2016), augmenting the risk-bearing capacity of EU institutions, with a solid guarantee and 
first-loss piece (FLP) provisions, appears appropriate to the current market conditions affecting 
Europe, whereas since the investment gap is more linked to risk averseness than to a lack of 
liquidity.  
As it is nowadays, the EFSI is not designed to focus on high-risk areas and non-bankable 
projects. That would require investments to be handled with a development bank guarantee 
system, in which the loans are covered by guarantees by a much higher share, and covering all 
investors or allowing the EIB to cover a larger share of the costs. The EIB itself is not a 
developing-country bank and the current tensions in Europe hardly foster the flourishing of a 
“developmental mind set”.20 
The EFSI does not carry an anti-cyclical mandate nor is it an instrument devised to address 
economic divergence and promote cohesion. Nonetheless, as ensuring stability in EU 
economies and upholding cohesion and socio-economic development are key goals of the 
Union, the EFSI, at the very least, should not unnecessarily exacerbate disparities. Particularly, 
with more room to use the EU guarantee in combination with other EU financing programmes, 
it is in a better position to help in less advantaged regions further.  
                                                     
20 See Thurbon (2016). 
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Figure 9. List of potential programme objectives 
 
Notes: Green border denotes EFSI main objectives; blue borders: 
objectives with which it should agree; red border: objective currently 
neglected. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
One of the goals of the EFSI was to relaunch investment targeted at SMEs, start-ups and 
innovative firms alike. It is still impossible to evaluate the impact of the EFSI in promoting 
technological transformation and innovation across Europe, but undoubtedly the programme 
is moving in that direction. Even though there is ample room to improve on delivering pan-
European and cross border infrastructure,21 EFSI is active in developing key and enabling 
infrastructure nationally. Particularly, renewable energy power plants and broadband 
deployment have been supported. As most of the projects are still in an inception phase and 
funding has not yet reached the real economy, it is not foreseeable to expect any sizable impact 
on economic growth or employment creation yet. In any event, the results will have to be 
assessed in the medium to long term.  
Among EFSI eligible sectors, investment in human capital has basically remained outside the 
radar, probably due to a lack of bankable projects. Rinaldi (2015) and EPSC (2016) already 
highlighted the opportunity to strengthen the human capital component of the programme.  
More recently Zuleeg and Huguenot-Noël (2016) made the case for a reorientation of EFSI 2.0 
towards social investment. A concrete support to lifelong learning in SMEs, skills upgrading 
trainings, apprenticeship schemes and re-activation policies, may well serve the purpose of 
enhancing competitiveness in EU economies, on top of contrasting unemployment. 
Potential synergies with the Commission’s proposal for a European Pillar of Social Rights22 or 
with the existing Social Investment Package should be explored. For instance, businesses joining 
the European Alliance for Apprenticeships could be supported by EFSI-financing to provide 
                                                     
21 Two observations on the limited contribution of EFSI to cross-border infrastructure: i) some projects, benefitting 
from member states’ support do not present a profile risk attractive for the EFSI portfolio and may be supported 
by EIB standard activities; ii) access to finance is not the primary obstacle to cross-border projects; regulatory and 
internal market issues do play a major role.   
22 The EP report on a European Pillar of Social Rights calls on EFSI to actively support social investment and 
affordable housing; see Rodrigues (2016).  
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work-based learning opportunities or an Investment Platform could be created to co-finance 
skills upgrade and digitalisation programmes for SMEs employees. To this end, promoting the 
joint employment of EFSI and the European Social Fund is key.  
As discussed in previous sections, EFSI appears to be on track to attain its expected results in 
terms of total investment mobilised (€315 billion) and leverage (x15). Nonetheless, to 
accomplish the more ambitious goal of impacting economic growth, re-boosting investment 
across Europe and creating jobs, we argue that more attention should be devoted to policies 
that are corollaries to EFSI. In fact, it constitutes just one part of the Investment Plan for Europe, 
but Pillars II and III can hardly command the same media and political attention. In what follows, 
we look at the main policy aspects which accompany EFSI, on the understanding that 
reinforcing the effectiveness and the geographical coverage of corollary policies is functional 
to enhancing the performance and geographical coverage of EFSI.  
Figure 10. EFSI corollary policies 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
 
4.1 Pillar II: The Advisory Hub and the Investment Portal  
One point that most EFSI evaluations agree on is the need to improve on technical assistance, 
namely the Advisory Hub (EIAH) (Rubio et al., 2016; EIB, 2016 and EY, 2016). The Advisory Hub 
can well serve as a single access point to promoters, firms and project-developers seeking 
technical support, and can help make the best of the otherwise fragmented expertise 
developed with EIB and Commission advisory services, e.g. JASPERS, ELENA, EPEC, Fi-Compass 
and Innovfin. Nonetheless, as made clear by Rubio et al. (2016), the resources allocated to the 
Advisory Hub are rather limited. JASPERS alone, an advisory service specifically designed to 
provide technical assistance to the 12 least-developed EU countries for ESIF-eligible projects, 
has an annual budget of approximately €30 million compared to about €26 million for the 
Advisory Hub, which is meant to serve the 28 member states (Rubio et al., 2016). Indeed, the 
EIAH is designed to be complementary and not to replace the existing technical assistance 
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services available through EU institutions, so that its budget de facto enlarges advisory services 
within the Union. Nonetheless, the current budget appears limited if compared to the mission 
and relevance that the Hub is given. On top of this, as serving as single point of entry for EU 
technical assistance, the Advisory Hub is expected to: i) address unmet needs (e.g. SMEs and 
Mid-caps, social infrastructure) by reinforcing and expanding advisory services, including 
possibly the development of ad-hoc services; ii) act as a coordination platform to ensure an 
efficient exchange of information and expertise among ‘internal’ advisory services. i.e. those 
already existing and run by EU institutions; iii) develop and manage the network of ‘external’ 
advisory services in partnership NPBs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), and managing authorities. A limited capacity, in terms of budget and number of staff, 
may limit the possibility to provide sufficient and prompt support in those geographical areas, 
or sectors, where technical assistance is most needed. At the moment, the EIAH is able to 
support quasi-bankable projects to become bankable or better structured. If a project is 
actually far from the threshold of becoming viable, as it can be the case in areas where 
institutional capacity is weaker, the cost of engaging may become too high given the current 
budget. Preliminary data collected by the European Commission indicate that most of the 
requests to the EIAH have been received from Italy (26), Bulgaria (25) and the UK (23); and from 
the private sector (62%).23  
The Commission’s proposal to extend EFSI up until 2020 correctly identifies the Advisory Hub 
as a pivotal supporting policy to expand and improve EFSI’s geographical and sectoral coverage, 
and recommends the EIB extend its outreach in different member states across Europe. Despite 
recognising the relevance of the Advisory Hub and the willingness to give it a greater role, the 
Commission does not put forward a specific proposal for increasing its means. Furthermore, 
rather than establishing local offices for the Advisory Hub, it was preferred to create a partner 
network that relies on NPBs and the EBRD24. If on the one hand it is correct to establish 
partnerships with those institutions that already possess relevant expertise at national, regional 
and local level; on the other hand, a partnership-based local presence for the Advisory Hub may 
fail to provide complete technical and advisory services where the capacity of NPBs is weaker, 
and most needed. An EIAH Partner Network can deliver a comprehensive and complete 
advisory services offer only under the assumption that national and regional partners have the 
capacity to provide prompt support and qualified expertise; an assumption which may not be 
met all around the EU. To reinforce the presence of the EIAH at national and regional level, we 
recommend pushing forward with the local presence of the Advisory Hub by establishing full-
fledged local offices which could take the form of Investment Hubs. Such Investment Hubs would 
act as national point of entry for technical assistance to project promoters, bring together staff 
and expertise from the EIB Group, NPBs and the EBRD, and actively enhance local capacity for 
advisory services.   
                                                     
23 Out of the 258 project-specific requests filed to the EIAH, 33,3% came from the public sector and 4.5% from 
NGOs. 
24 As of December 2016, 20 NPBs have signed the MoU to establish cooperation with the EIB in the context of the 
EIAH. The involvement of the EBRD is instead foreseen for Bulgaria and Romania.  
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Equally part of the second pillar of the Investment Plan for Europe, the European Investment 
Project Portal (EIPP), is not likely to contribute largely to remove bottlenecks to investment or 
to boost demand but it still has the potential to contribute partly to unlock investment in 
Europe. At present, the portal features 139 projects,25 50 of which are located in Greece. Online 
since 1st June 2016, the Portal,26 does not appear to have attained much visibility to the general 
public, however, a closer look at the analytics of the Portal confirms that the policy instrument, 
with approximately 300 to 400 unique page views a day in January 2017, has been perhaps able 
to reach a specialised audience. Over the last six months,27 the Portal had about 116,800 visits 
and 42,500 returning visits; most importantly, over 300 contact forms have been sent from 
EIPP users to project promoters with over 100 projects already contracted via the website. This 
shows that the Portal can play a role in matching demand with offer of investment and giving 
visibility to investment projects in Europe; however, in order to maximise its impact, the Portal 
should become a solid reference for investors and professionals working in investment banking 
and financial services. Steps have to be taken to boost user retention – so that there is a high 
share of returning users - and to ensure that navigation from project to project becomes more 
user friendly – so that the number of pages visited per visit increases. By means of simple tags, 
project-pages should suggest and present projects in the same geographical area or industry. 
Through the EIPP, it should be possible to send users regular updates about new and promising 
projects. Such technical arrangements should be relatively easy to implement and may help to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Portal swiftly.   
4.2 Pillar III: Structural reforms and regulatory barriers to investment 
The success of EFSI as an economic recovery plan crucially depends on the concurrent 
implementation of serious structural reforms. EFSI alone, in the absence of a framework that is 
conducive to more sustainable economic growth, will not address Europe’s problems or 
revamp job creation. This requires EU countries to introduce reforms that increase the 
employability of citizens and the value added of domestic production. Sectoral analyses carried 
out for digital and energy-efficiency infrastructures confirm that the regulatory framework is 
largely responsible for under-investment (Rubio et al., 2016). 
The Commission effectively designed an Investment Plan for Europe based on three pillars, out 
of which the third was meant to remove barriers to investment at both national and European 
level.  
Alongside the launch of the Investment Plan, the Commission presented a country-by-country 
list of regulatory barriers to investment on which the focus has been, at best, partial. In 
addition, to make Europe a more investment-friendly environment, the agenda on deepening 
the internal market has to progress rapidly. The Capital Markets Union, the Digital Single 
                                                     
25 As of 17 January 2017. 
26 See https://ec.europa.eu/eipp. 
27 Data by the European Commission refer to the period 7 June 2016 until 11 January 2017. 
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Market and the Energy Union can all move in the direction of providing the private sector with 
the right incentives to unleash investment in Europe, but member states should seize the 
opportunity to establish veritable economies of scale for pan-European infrastructure in 
telecommunications, transports and energy.  
The European Commission and EIB have recently published comprehensive reports28 that 
identify barriers to investment hampering the implementation of projects on the ground and 
de facto deterring investment. Progress towards establishing an investment-friendly regulatory 
system at national level is also monitored in the framework of the European Semester and 
addressed by specific recommendations. Supplementary efforts to facilitate structural reforms 
at member state level are advisable, for instance the Investment Hubs introduced in the 
previous paragraph, could also be given two additional functions: 1) a mandate to monitor 
progress towards removing country-specific barriers hampering investment in partnership with 
national authorities and 2) they could envisage on-demand technical assistance and support to 
local public administration for the removal of such barrier and the design of structural reforms 
impacting investment climate. That could bring in the tailor-made assistance of the Structural 
Reform Support Service (SRSS) and provide peer-to-peer collaboration and support from 
seconded experts. 
4.3 Investment Platforms and National Promotional Banks  
Since the launching of the programme, it was rather evident that much of the success of the 
EFSI would depend on the ability to reach crucial sectors and drive investment towards less 
market-savvy regions. Investment platforms (IPs), broadly defined as a co-investment 
arrangements,29 are indeed a great vehicle to catalyse investment in a set of projects with 
either a common geographical or sectoral scope. The emergence of IPs has been particularly 
slow and just now, about a year and half into the programme, they have begun to enter into 
being.  
At present, 7 IPs have been approved, 4 under the IIW and 3 under the SEMW, but they are not 
all operational (see Figure 11 for the list of approved IPs). As the EIB guidelines for IPs and 
current practice seem to suggest, the establishment of an IP requires a partnership with a 
National Promotional Bank (NPB) or Institution (NPI). As Figure 11 makes clear, the Italian NPB, 
the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), has been particularly active in creating direct access to EFSI 
                                                     
28 See EIB (2016c), EIB (2016d) and European Commission (2016b).  
29 Art 2.4. of the EFSI regulation defines investment platforms (IPs) as “special purpose vehicles, managed 
accounts, contract-based co-financing or risk-sharing arrangements or arrangements established by any other 
means by which entities channel a financial contribution in order to finance a number of investment projects, and 
which may include: (a) national or sub-national platforms that group together several investment projects on the 
territory of a given member state; (b) multi-country or regional platforms that group together partners from 
several member states or third countries interested in projects in a given geographic area; (c) thematic platforms 
that group together investment projects in a given sector”. 
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guarantees. Unsurprisingly, Italy is the number one recipient country in terms of mobilised 
investment from SMEW-supported initiatives.  
Two observations can be made with respect to the value that NPBs can bring to the success of 
the EFSI as a budgetary policy. On the one hand, if the cultural change and the openness 
towards engaging into higher-risk activities is spreading from the EIB to NPBs, as the Italian case 
suggests, the impact of EFSI into mobilising private investment could enjoy a potentially higher 
multiplier effect. On the other hand, NPBs are not well-established throughout Europe30 and 
their limited geographical spread may pose additional barriers to EFSI’s overall geographical 
coverage.  
Figure 11. List of investment platforms 
 
Source: EIB. 
 
4.4 The ‘investment clause’ of the Stability and Growth Pact 
Whilst economic growth and investment are desirable all across Europe, they are particularly 
needed in those countries facing financial and labour market imbalances. It is therefore striking 
that the current application of the ‘investment clause’ included in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), penalises member states under the SPG corrective arm. On “making the best use of the 
                                                     
30 See Whittle, Malan and Bianchini (2016) for an account of active NPBs in Europe. 
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Flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”, the European Commission 
(2015) stresses that national contributions to the EFSI will not be taken into account by the 
Commission; however, for the co-financing by member states of EFSI-backed investment at 
project level, countries under the preventive arm must meet a number of stringent conditions 
and the 3% deficit reference holds. The ‘investment clause’ allows member states to deviate 
from their budgetary objectives in order to provide co-financing to EU-funded projects, 
whether under ESIF, Horizon 2020, CEF or EFSI (Rubio et al., 2016), However, countries under 
the excessive deficit procedure can hardly benefit from such a clause. While public-debt 
sustainability is a legitimate concern, withdrawing project-based productive investments 
ensures the deepening of the economic recession and a lowering of long-term endogenous 
growth capacity, as skilled workers emigrate or the number of long term unemployed increase, 
with a fall in their employability. In the case of instruments like EFSI, the requirement of a 
budget balance is particularly detrimental, as it is exactly the market-based approach that 
encourage a focus on economically sound project planning and the design of innovative 
projects of high quality. Such rules also hinder cross-border operations, when one of the 
partners is “in the wrong country”. Furthermore, it is rather questionable to potentially penalise 
project developers and innovative firms with bankable projects, based on the government’s 
budget deficit. As suggested by Rubio et al. (2016), a minimum step would be to expand the 
clause to cover those countries under the SGP corrective arm.  
5. Conclusions 
Results to date seem to suggest that EFSI is on track to attain its expected targets in terms of 
total investment mobilised (€315 billion) and leveraged (x15). Nevertheless, especially in view 
of its extension until 2020, there is a legitimate concern over the choice of instrument and the 
actual need for EFSI. Could an alternative have been used? Is EFSI the right instrument? Is it still 
necessary?  
Although thorough answers to such questions are beyond the scope of this paper, we identified 
a few issues within EFSI on which improvements are needed and where the new regulation for 
EFSI 2.0 should insist and deliver. A revision of the interpretation of additionality, an enhanced 
framework to deploy ESI funds and the EFSI guarantee together, respect of basic principles of 
democratic accountability and the unity of the budget are focal points on which a correct policy 
design should focus on.   
A list of areas where we recommend policy intervention is listed in Figure 12. To follow the 
structure of this paper, we distinguish between reforms pertaining to EFSI itself, its design and 
regulation, and to those relating to accompanying policies that are crucial for the success of 
EFSI as an effective budgetary instrument.   
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Figure 12. Summary of main policy recommendations  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Partially, the creation of EFSI stems from the lack of resources to address the challenges in the 
EU budget. However, EFSI is not an extension of the EU budget grants, rather it has the role of 
triggering investments in projects that only require a certain level of guarantee and the 
reassurance given by the green light from the EIB, an institution known from its strong in house 
technical project evaluation capacity. EFSI has created in fact a new role for the EU rather than 
just expand its operations under ESIF.  
One of the downsides of EFSI is that it does not sufficiently address regions in the EU where 
support is needed. However, EFSI was not designed to operate as instrument helping areas in 
decline or to contribute to cohesion. To do so, there would be a need to reform EFSI by creating 
a special instrument for areas of higher risk, covering more risk and accepting higher potential 
losses, acting more as a development rather than investment-oriented financial instrument.  
If EFSI is to attract investments in the regions that are most in need of investment, a 
development window with reinforced risk and guarantee rules is required. To this purpose, 
guarantee arrangements that are specific to the EIB external mandate could be used as a model 
to design internal procedures for the EU as well.  For outside EU activities, the EIB makes use 
On EFSI 
Design & 
Regulation 
Revise Regulation on 
Additionality
As the IIW and SMEW target different market failures and have different project-
evaluation processes, we recommend amending EFSI regulation to include a window-
specific definition of additionality.
Enhance Accountability 
and Transparency
The proposal for EFSI 2.0 seems to go in the right direction, but should also make room 
for parliamentary oversight; for instance, the right to appoint Steering Board members 
could be extended to the EP. Furthermore, a more transparent approach is needed to 
determine the EFSI multiplier effect and the arrangements providing direct support to 
financial intermediaries. 
Focus on Human Capital 
and Social Investment
A long-term investment strategy should couple investment in infrastructure and 
innovation to human capital investment. Synergies can be found between EFSI and the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, the Social Investment Package and the European 
Alliance for Apprenticeship in order to co-finance skills upgrading programs for SMEs 
employees, apprenticeships and reactivation policies.  
Add a Devevelopment 
Window
To relaunch investment in areas where markets and capacity are less developed, the EIB 
could build on the mechanisms already in place for its external mandate in order to 
cover for region-specific operational and market risks in the weakest EU regions. To this 
end, joint employment with ESI Funds, as a first-loss guarantee, could be explored.  
On 
Corollary 
Policies
Establish Investment Hubs at 
country level
To enhance the reach and capacity of technical assistance, the EIAH should establish 
country offices and not only local partnerships. An Investment Hub at national level 
could bring together the expertise of the EIB Group, the NPB and the EBRD, and work 
as a national point of entry for technical assistance to project promoters. It could also 
be given mandate to monitor national progress toward removing barriers to 
investment and facilitate the tailor-made on-demand intervention of the SRSS.
Boost the EIPP potential for 
user retention
To make the maximum of the Project Portal, it must become a real resouce for 
investors. The share of returning users and visit lenght may be enhanced with relatively 
easy-to-implement technical improvements. For instance, by means of notifications 
about new projects on areas or industries of interest for the user and by the 
simultaneous visualisation of similar projects.   
Revise the application of the 
'Investment Clause'
Initial voluntary contributions as one-off measures are rightly not accounted for as 
deficit. Clarity should be made concerning MS co-financing of individual projects and 
investment platforms, particularly in view of EFSI extension to 2020. We recommend 
expanding the investment clause to MS under the corrective arm and relaxing the 
conditions for those under the preventive arm. Alternatively, all national public 
support to EFSI-backed projects could be granted one-off status.  
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of a dedicated guarantee covered by member states, which generally kicks-in to absorb the 
country-specific (political) risk. Perhaps a similar arrangement, preserving the EIB rating, could 
be devised within EU borders to cover defaulting loans for projects developed in high risk 
regions. That does not mean covering for sovereign risk, for which the EIB assumes zero risk for 
all member states, but rather covering country-specific or region-specific operational and 
market risks. To this end, such a Development Window within EU borders could foresee the 
joint employment of ESIF and EFSI products with structural and cohesion funds providing a first-
loss guarantee in selected regions.  
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